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Academic probation is a nearly universal tool used by universities to ensure cur-rently enrolled students achieve minimum academic standards. The general 
structure of such programs is simple—if a student’s grade point average (GPA) is 
below a certain threshold, the student is placed on academic probation which serves 
as a wake-up call and can lead to escalating penalties. Our paper uses longitudinal 
data from three campuses at a large Canadian university to estimate the causal impact 
of being placed on academic probation by exploiting the discontinuous nature of the 
policy in a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Despite the prevalence of academic 
probation, we are the first to analyze its causal impacts on student outcomes.1 More 
generally, our paper serves as an analysis of how individuals respond to a threat of 
punishment, as failure to improve one’s grades after being placed on probation leads 
to suspension.
Due to concerns about welfare, experiments providing such a large negative 
incentive often are not viable. As such, examining students’ responses to academic 
probation provides a rare opportunity to examine the impacts of a negative  incentive 
1 The only prior empirical analysis of academic probation compares the mean retention rate of engineering 
students on probation to the mean retention rate of those in good academic standing (Alejandro Scalise et al. 
2000).
* Lindo: University of Oregon, Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403–
1285 (e-mail: jlindo@uoregon.edu); Sanders: University of California, Davis, Department of Economics, One 
Shields Ave, Davis, CA 95616 (e-mail: njsanders@ucdavis.edu); Oreopoulos: University of British Columbia, 
Department of Economics, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1 (e-mail: oreo@exchange.ubc.ca). We 
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Conference, the University of British Columbia, the University of Waterloo, and the NBER Higher Education 
Working Group for their helpful comments and suggestions at various stages of this paper.
† To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the articles 
page at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.2.95.
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in an important real-world setting. While there is a fairly extensive literature on 
the causal effects of other explicit university policies, these studies have focused 
primarily on positive incentives and services.2 A handful of recent papers examin-
ing the effects of college remediation stand out as the only prior studies of negative 
incentives in a postsecondary setting.3 Like students placed on academic probation, 
students placed into remedial classes are given a signal that their performance is 
not satisfactory. Thus, studies that measure the effect of being placed into remedial 
classes capture the combined impact of the negative signal and the impact of being 
required to take remedial classes. Similarly, in this paper, we measure the combined 
effect of the negative signal and the effect of being subjected to a more rigid perfor-
mance standard in the next term.
Specifically, once a student has been placed on academic probation, she must 
earn a GPA above the campus-set standard in the next term or she will be suspended 
from the university for one year. Placing students on academic probation is equiva-
lent to setting a minimum standard for their future performance. In this sense, our 
results have implications for the wide variety of circumstances in which setting a 
standard might be used as a means of affecting performance. In addition to school 
administration, applications include management, parenting, and health and safety 
regulation.
While we are the first to consider the effect of a performance standard at the 
university level, a large prior literature has examined performance standards at the 
secondary level in the form of high school exit exams. One of the issues this litera-
ture has tried to address is whether or not high school exit exams discourage stu-
dents from remaining in school, as this concern has been a focal point for critics of 
the increasingly popular policy. Empirical studies have found mixed results in this 
regard.4
Our results also provide an opportunity to empirically examine theoretical mod-
els of imposing performance standards. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2000) 
outline one such model which predicts that setting a performance standard involves 
an inherent trade-off between motivating some agents to improve their performance 
and discouraging other agents from making any attempt at all. We explore the extent 
of this trade-off by analyzing the effect of being placed on academic probation on 
2 Examples include papers analyzing the effects of advising and merit scholarships (Joshua Angrist, Daniel 
Lang, and Philip Oreopoulos 2009; Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Bas van der Klaauw forthcoming), 
tuition costs (Iida Häkkinen and Roope Uusitalo 2003; Martin Heineck, Mathias Kifmann, and Norman Lorenz 
2006; Pietro Garibaldi et al. 2007), financial aid (Stephen L. DesJardins, Dennis A. Ahlburg, and Brian P. McCall 
2002), and appointment to the Dean’s List (W. Burleigh Seaver and Richard J. Quarton 1976; revisited by Thomas 
D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell 1979).
3 See Brian A. Jacob and Lars Lefgren (2004), Francisco Martorell and Isaac McFarlin (2007), Juan Carlos 
Calcagno and Bridget Terry Long (2008), and Eric P. Bettinger and Long (2009), among others.
4 There are two distinct types of studies in this literature: studies of the effects of the presence of high school 
exit exams and studies of the effects of failing high school exit exams. Both strands of literature have produced 
mixed results. In the former, Chandra Muller (1998), Muller and Kathryn S. Schiller (2000), Martin Carnoy and 
Susanna Loeb (2003), and John Robert Warren and Krista N. Jenkins (2004) find that exit exams have no effect 
on dropout rates while Audrey. L. Amrein and David C. Berliner (2003) find that they increase dropout rates. 
Jacob (2001) and Thomas S. Dee and Jacob (forthcoming) show that there is substantial heterogeneity in students 
responses. In the latter, Bryan W. Griffin and Mark H. Heidorn (1996); Dewey G. Cornell, Jon A. Krosnick, and 
LinChiat Chang (2006); John P. Papay, Richard J. Murnane, and John B. Willett (2008); and Dongshu Ou (2009) 
all find evidence that failing exams cause at least some groups of students to drop out of school early while 
Martorell (2004) finds no evidence of this type of response.
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the decision of students to drop out and on the subsequent performance for those 
who remain.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on gender differences in 
response to educational incentives. Previous studies have found that women are 
more responsive to positive incentives than men. Women respond to advising and 
scholarship programs while men do not (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2007); 
tuition reductions impact college completion rates for women more than men (Susan 
Dynarski 2008); and the effects of high school achievement awards appear limited 
to women (Angrist and Victor Lavy 2002). However, because the existing literature 
has focused on policies providing positive incentives, little is known about gender 
differences in response to negative incentives.
Our RD research design is motivated by the idea that students with a GPA just 
above the academic probation threshold after the first year provide a good coun-
terfactual for those who have a GPA just below the academic probation threshold. 
As long as characteristics related to student outcomes are continuous through the 
threshold, we can measure the effect of being placed on probation in a RD design 
framework. It is important to keep in mind that, like the students placed on proba-
tion, “control” students must also get bad grades in their first year to fall near the 
cutoff. Poor academic performance in the first year of college is likely to have an 
effect on behavior regardless of whether or not a student is placed on probation. As 
such, effects that we estimate are over and above the effects of getting bad grades 
alone. We can think of our estimates as identifying the effect of being sent a letter 
that explicitly states a student has performed poorly and informs them that they are 
being subjected to the performance standard described above.
Our results indicate that the effects of academic probation are remarkably het-
erogeneous. Consistent with Bénabou and Tirole’s (2000) model, being placed on 
academic probation after the first year discourages some students from returning to 
school and motivates those who remain to improve their subsequent performance. 
We find differences across prior academic performance, gender, and native lan-
guage. We find that being placed on academic probation doubles the probability of 
dropping out for students with high school grades above the median, but has little 
impact on students with high school grades below the median. Being placed on pro-
bation doubles the probability that men drop out, but has no effect on the decision of 
women to drop out. Finally, probation increases the probability that native English 
speakers drop out, and has no effect on the decision of nonnative English speakers 
to drop out. Further, we find that being placed on probation improves the grades of 
returning students across all groups, and we show that these effects are too large to 
be attributed to nonrandom attrition.
Finally, we consider the effect of being placed on academic probation on gradu-
ation rates. We find being placed on probation simultaneously motivates some stu-
dents to improve their grades while causing others to drop out, so there is no clear 
prediction of a positive or negative effect on the probability of graduation. Overall, 
our estimates suggest that being placed on academic probation reduces graduation 
rates, especially for students who performed better in high school.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the university 
and its academic probation program in more detail. Section II reviews Bénabou and 
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Tirole’s (2000) model of performance standards. Sections III and IV describe the 
data and our empirical strategy. Section V presents our main results. Section VI 
discusses our main results. Section VII concludes.
I.  Institutional Background
Our data comes from a large Canadian university made up of three individual 
campuses: one central campus and two smaller satellite campuses. The central cam-
pus (Campus 1) has an acceptance rate of about 55 percent, while the two satel-
lite campuses (Campus 2 and Campus 3) have acceptance rates of approximately 
77 percent. The central campus resembles a large US state college, while the satel-
lite campuses have more part-time and commuter students. Campus 1 and Campus 
2 share identical rules regarding academic probation—students with a cumulative 
GPA below 1.5 grade points are placed on academic probation. Campus 3 has a GPA 
cutoff at 1.6 grade points. For the purposes of our analysis, students from all three 
campuses have been combined into a single sample.5 We account for the difference 
in cutoff points in our RD analysis by using students’ distances from their campus’ 
cutoff as the running variable rather than absolute GPA.6
When a student is placed on academic probation, a letter is sent notifying them 
of their current academic standing. The letter specifies why the student has been 
placed on probation, how to regain good academic standing, and the consequences 
of failing to improve. The letter also encourages students to continue at the univer-
sity and improve their academic performance, and lists various services provided by 
the university aimed at helping them to do so. A copy of the letter sent to students at 
Campus 2 is in the Appendix.
Because many freshman classes span the entire year, students’ academic stand-
ings are not evaluated for the first time until the end of their first year.7 At Campus 1 
and Campus 2, students’ academic standings are evaluated again at the end of every 
subsequent full scholastic year and summer term. At Campus 3, students’ academic 
standings are evaluated again at the end of each subsequent term.
Students on academic probation face the threat of suspension after subsequent 
sessions if their grades do not improve. At all campuses, students on probation can 
avoid suspension and return to good academic standing by bringing their cumula-
tive GPA up to the cutoff.8 Students who fail to sufficiently improve their grades are 
5 In an earlier version of the paper, we used this across-campus variation to examine the effects of academic 
probation in a difference-in-difference framework. These results were similar to the RD estimates but imprecise 
due to a smaller sample size.
6 One might expect academic probation to have heterogeneous impacts across campuses since the rules and 
composition of students are somewhat different across the campuses. However, in results not shown, we find that 
the effects of being placed on probation are fairly similar across the three campuses.
7 Students also must attempt a minimum number of credits before they are evaluated. We omit all students 
who have not yet been evaluated by the end of their first full year. It is possible this is endogenous, though unlikely. 
If a student drops a course before the deadline, the course grade will not be counted in determining academic 
probation (or GPA in general). If this incentive to drop is continuous through the cutoff, however, this should not 
pose a problem.
8 Students who do not raise their cumulative GPA up to the cutoff can still avoid suspension by achieving a 
per-session GPA above a particular minimum specified by their campus. However, this will not be relevant for 
students close to the cutoff, as it will be weakly easier to achieve the cumulative GPA requirement.
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suspended for one full academic year. If suspended students choose to return to the 
university and again fail to sufficiently improve their grades, they can be suspended 
for three years. A third failure to meet the GPA requirement can lead to permanent 
suspension from all campuses.
II.  Theoretical Background
In this section, we first review Bénabou and Tirole’s (2000) model of agents’ 
responses to a performance standard. The model is framed as a game between a 
principal and an agent, where the principal has the ability to set standards for the 
agent. While Bénabou and Tirole (2000) consider the model from the perspective 
of both the agent and the principal, we focus only on the agent. We then relate this 
model to academic probation.
Consider an agent facing a choice between three possible paths: option 1, option 2, 
or neither. If the agent chooses neither option, both her costs and benefits are zero. If 
the agent attempts option i, she incurs cost ci and, if successful, gains the benefit Vi. 
If the agent attempts option i and fails, she still incurs a cost but receives no benefit. 
Option 1 is an easy option with a low potential benefit while option 2 is a difficult 
option with a high potential benefit. Costs and benefits can be summarized as
(1)  0 < c1 < c2  0 < V1 < V2 .
Ability is expressed as the probability of successfully completing either option, 
where higher ability translates into a higher probability of success. The probability 
of success for either option is θ. Assuming the agent has perfect information regard-
ing her ability (θ), she solves
(2) max {0, θ V1 − c1, θ V2 − c2 } .
Let  _ θ be the level of ability for which the agent is indifferent between attempting 
neither option and attempting option 1, and let   
_
 θ be the level of ability for which the 
agent is indifferent between attempting option 1 and attempting option 2. With the 
following assumption,
(3)   _ θ ≡   
c1 __ 
V1
 <  
_
 θ ≡   c2 − c1 ______
V2 − V1
  < 1,
which ensures that both options are optimal for at least some θ. It can be shown 
that the lowest ability individuals (θ <  __ θ) choose neither option, the highest abil-
ity individuals ( 
_
 θ < θ) choose the difficult option, and the remaining individuals 
( __ θ < θ <  
_
 θ) choose the easier option.9
9 Interestingly, the same results arise from a model in which the agent is sure to be successful in whichever 
task she chooses, but the cost of each task is inversely related to the ability measure θ. That is, the agent would 
solve max{0, V1 − (c1/θ), V2 − (c2/θ)}. Expressed in this way, the model can feature decreasing marginal returns 
to ability. The same results can also arise from a model in which the  probability of success is increasing in ability 
and the cost is decreasing in ability. For example, if the agent solves max {0,  √ 
_
 θV1 − (c1/ √ 
_
 θ),  √ 
_
 θV2 − (c2/ √ 
_
 θ)}.
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If the principal removes option 1 as a possible course of action, perhaps by forbid-
ding it or imposing an additional cost on it, such that it is always inferior to other 
options, then the agent will choose option 2 if and only if
(4)  θ ≥  c2 __ 
V2
≡ θ*
and pursue neither option otherwise. Within the range of agents who would choose 
option 1 if it remained a possibility, the model predicts those with the higher ability 
will work harder (engaging in option 2), while those with the lower ability will give 
up (pursuing neither option).10
This model naturally lends itself to analyzing how students might respond to 
being placed on academic probation. Consider the choice faced by two students 
(agents) whose first year GPAs were near the academic probation threshold, one 
just above and one just below. Since the student just above the threshold remains in 
good academic standing, his options are unrestricted. These options can be placed 
into three categories: return to school with the intent of achieving some low GPA 
(option 1), return with the intent of achieving some high GPA (option 2), or drop out 
of school (neither option 1 nor 2).
As a result of being placed on probation, the student just below the cutoff faces a 
different set of choices. We can think of academic probation as the administration 
forbidding, or placing an extremely large negative incentive on, pursuing option 1. 
In the framework of the model, if the student below the cutoff chooses to pursue 
option 1, she will be suspended from the university.
The testable implications of the model’s theoretical framework are the following:
• Forbidding option 1 will increase the overall probability of students dropping out.
• Forbidding option 1 will increase the performance of those who return.
• Forbidding option 1 will cause relatively low-ability students to drop out and rela-
tively high-ability students to return and work harder.11
III.  Data
The data used in the analysis are from an administrative dataset of college stu-
dents from the large Canadian university described in Section I. Observations are 
at the student level and cover a nine-year period from 1996 to 2005 with each scho-
lastic year broken into fall, winter, and summer terms. The data includes student 
term registration status, GPA, academic standing, gender, age, first language, and 
a  measure of high school performance. We use the set of background variables for 
falsification tests and as controls in some regression specifications.
We restrict the sample to students we can potentially observe for two years. Since 
the data are through the end of the 2005 school year, we restrict to students who 
10 Specifically, those with θ in [ θ*,  
_
 θ ] will now choose option 2, while those with θ in [   _ θ, θ* ] will now choose 
not to pursue either option.
11 Robert M. Costrell (1994) discusses educational performance standards in a different theoretical framework 
that leads to similar predictions.
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entered in the 2004 school year or earlier. This leaves eight cohorts of students. We 
omit students with missing data for any variables of interest. The variable that is 
most often missing is the high school grade measure which is only available for stu-
dents who attended high school in the province (84 percent of the sample). This vari-
able is a student’s average GPA in courses that are universally taken by high school 
students in the province. This measure of high school achievement is intended to be 
consistent across high schools and is used as a part of the criteria that determines 
admissions at Canadian universities.
We also restrict the sample to students entering the university between the ages 
of 17 and 21 (99 percent of the remaining sample). Additionally, we keep only stu-
dents who have had their academic standing evaluated at the end of their first year 
(98 percent of the remaining sample).12 Finally, we limit the sample to students 
within 1.2 grade points of their academic probation cutoff (corresponding to the 
largest bandwidth we consider in our regressions). This effectively drops students 
who failed all of their first year classes in addition to students who cleared the cutoff 
by a wide margin. The resulting sample includes 25,389 students. Further restricting 
the sample to students within 0.6 of the cutoff leaves 12,530 students.
The first column of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the restricted sam-
ple. The students average entry age is 18.7 years. Approximately 38 percent are male, 
72 percent have English as their first language, and 87 percent were born in North 
America.13 Fifty-one percent of the students attend Campus 1 (the central cam-
pus). Of the remaining students, 20 percent attend Campus 2 and 29 percent attend 
Campus 3. For the most part the means at the limits of the cutoff are most relevant, 
and these are discussed in subsequent sections. Before proceeding, we should note 
that a sizable fraction of students in our sample (25 percent) are placed on academic 
probation after their first year.14 While it is unfortunate that so many students fail to 
meet their campus’ academic requirements, this is a positive aspect for our research 
design because it improves our ability to obtain estimates on both sides of the pro-
bationary cutoff.
IV.  Empirical Strategy
We begin by estimating the impacts of being placed on academic probation after 
the first year. At the end of the first year the probation status for student i at campus 
c is a deterministic function of their GPA, which can be expressed as
(5)   ProB ic  year 1 = 1(GPAnor m ic  year 1 < 0),
where  GPAnorm ic 
 year 1 is the distance between student i’s first year GPA and the 
probationary cutoff at her campus c. Because the discontinuity in probation status 
is “sharp,” as we will show in Section VA, as long as other student characteristics 
12 In almost all cases, if a student was not evaluated it was due to an insufficient number of attempted credits.
13 If a student’s first language is not English, it is usually an Asian language. Despite being a Canadian institu-
tion, less than 1 percent of students have French as their first language.
14 Of the entire student body, 16 percent are placed on probation after their first year.
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related to the outcomes are continuous through the threshold, the treatment effect for 
students near the threshold can be obtained by comparing the outcomes of students 
just below the threshold to those just above the threshold.
The following equation can be used to estimate the effects of academic probation 
on subsequent student outcomes:
(6)  yic = m( GPAnorm ic  year 1 ) + δ1( GPAnorm ic  year 1 < 0) + uic ,
where yic is an outcome for student i at campus c, m( GPAnorm ic  year 1 ) is a continu-
ous function of students’ standardized first year GPAs (the distance from their cam-
pus’ probationary cutoff), 1( GPAnorm ic  year 1 < 0) is an indicator equal to one if the 
student’s GPA is below the probationary cutoff, and uic is a random error term. The 
coefficient of interest is δ, the estimated impact of being placed on academic proba-
tion after the first year.
As suggested by Guido W. Imbens and Thomas Lemieux (2008), we estimate the 
discontinuity using local linear regressions with rectangular kernel weights.15 We 
present results using a bandwidth of 0.6 grade points. In prior versions of the paper 
(available upon request), we have shown similar results using bandwidths of 0.3 and 
1.2 grade points, results controlling for observables, and results based on models 
15 Our regression equation is given by:
yic = α + δ1( GPAnorm ic  year 1 < 0) + β(GPAnor m ic  year 1 )
 + γ (GPAnor m ic  year 1 ) 3 1(GPAnor m ic  year 1 < 0) + uic ,




High school grade percentile 33.33 23.29
Credits attempted in first year 4.43 0.53
Age at entry 18.72 0.74
Male 0.38 0.48
English is first language 0.72 0.45
Born in North America 0.87 0.34
At Campus 1 0.49 0.50
At Campus 2 0.21 0.41
At Campus 3 0.31 0.46
outcomes
Distance from cutoff in 1st year 0.11 0.33
On probation after 1st year 0.35 0.47
Ever on academic probation 0.46 0.50
Left university after 1st evaluation 0.05 0.22
Distance from cutoff at next evaluation 0.47 0.81
Ever suspended 0.16 0.37
Graduated by year 4 0.29 0.45
Graduated by year 5 0.56 0.50
Graduated by year 6 0.67 0.48
notes: For all variables except graduation rates and next evaluation distance from the cutoff, 
the sample consists of the 12,530 students within 0.6 grade points of the cutoff in their first 
year. Graduation rate samples are 8,821 for four years, 7,293 for five years, and 6,005 for six-
years. 11,258 students are observed with a GPA following their first evaluation.
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controlling for a polynomial in the running variable. Since GPA data are discrete 
(in hundredths of a grade point), we cluster the standard errors as recommended by 
Davis S. Lee and David Card (2008).
V.  Results
In this section, we begin by testing the validity of the regression discontinuity 
design. Then, we examine the effects of being placed on academic probation on the 
decision of students to drop out, subsequent GPAs, probabilities of suspension, and 
graduation rates in addition to the heterogeneity of these effects across students’ 
prior academic performance, gender, and native language.
A. tests of the Validity of the rd Approach
Nonrandom sorting is a main concern with any RD design in which those who 
could be affected by the policy might know the cutoff. In our case, this would appear 
if students just below the cutoff were actively influencing their GPAs to avoid proba-
tion (e.g., convincing teachers to give them a higher grade to raise their GPA above 
the cutoff point) or expending just enough effort to get grades above the cutoff. By 
focusing on academic probation status at the end of the first year, we decrease the 
likelihood of this concern. First year students are less familiar with campus poli-
cies and, thus, less likely to know what grades would be required to avoid academic 
probation.16 In addition, though Campus 3 has semester-length first-year courses, 
most first year courses span the entire year at Campuses 1 and 2, and the majority 
of the grade is based on evaluation at the end of the term. This makes it difficult for 
students to correctly “hit” a performance point just above the cutoff, especially given 
that their overall GPA is calculated over several courses.
If sorting were a problem, we would expect to see a discontinuity in the distribu-
tion of grades at the cutoff, as a disproportionate number of students would fall just 
above the cutoff relative to the number of students just below the cutoff.17 Figure 1 
shows the distribution of students’ first year grades relative to their campus cutoff, 
with cell sizes of 0.1 grade points. Using each of these cells as an observation, the 
figure also shows the predicted cell sizes based on local linear regressions using rect-
angular kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.6. The estimated discontinuity at the 
threshold is not statistically significant, indicating that the distribution of  students is 
continuous through the threshold.18 We have also verified that the discontinuity is 
not significant using smaller cell sizes and bandwidths.19
16 To verify that those most likely to be affected by probation were no more likely to be informed about the 
policy, we conducted a survey in an introductory economic course regarding the policies of academic probation. 
Only 15 percent of students said they knew the academic probation cutoff “for sure.” An additional 19 percent 
said they were “pretty sure” they knew the cutoff. We found no evidence that students’ grades are related to their 
knowledge about academic probation.
17 At the same time, this might not be the case if the distribution of grades is fixed. For example, there might 
be a situation in which some students manipulate their grades to get themselves above the cutoff but, as a result of 
their efforts, other marginal students are pushed below the cutoff.
18 This test is similar to that proposed by Justin McCrary (2008).
19 We have also verified that there are not significant discontinuities in the distributions of students in each of 
the subgroups we consider in our analysis.
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Our research design requires both observable and unobservable characteristics 
related to student outcomes to be continuous through the threshold. Table 2 explores 
the extent to which a wide range of observable characteristics are continuous through 
the cutoff. Significant discontinuities would indicate that students with particular 
characteristics are more or less able to manipulate their grades so as to avoid being 
placed on probation. As a whole, these estimates support the validity of our research 
design. We find no significant discontinuities in students’ high school grades, credits 
attempted in the first year at the university, age at entry, gender, birthplace, native 
language, or campus attended.
B. first year GPAs and Academic Probation
Figure 2 and the first panel of Table 3 show the estimated discontinuity in probation 
status at the end of the first year. Because this discontinuity is sharp,  discontinuities 
in other student outcomes can be interpreted as the causal effect of being placed on 
probation at the end of the first year.20
The second panel of Table 3 shows the estimated impact on the probability that 
a student is ever placed on academic probation. These estimates make it clear that a 
20 While the estimated discontinuity is approximately equal to one, it may not be identically equal to one 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Student Grades Relative to their Cutoff
notes: Each small hollow circle indicates the number of students with a distance from their 
cutoff within 0.05 points (including the lower, but not the upper, endpoint). Using each of these 
cells as an observation, the curve is predicted from local linear regressions with a bandwidth 
of 0.6 using rectangular kernel weights. The estimated control mean is 1059 and the estimated 
discontinuity is 58 ( p-value = 0.219).
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sizable fraction of students who just pass the threshold at the end of their first year 
fall below the threshold in later terms and are subsequently placed on academic pro-
bation. While there are some differences across groups, this occurs for 33 percent 
of such students on average. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting 
the results of our analysis. The effects that we estimate measure the impact of being 
placed on academic probation at the end of the first year of college in a setting in 
which “safe” students face the real possibility of being placed on probation in future 
terms. In other words, the controls might be thought of as receiving a much weaker 
form of the same treatment, and the effects that we estimate are over and above the 
effect of such a treatment.
Table 2—Estimated Discontinuities in Observable Characteristics
HS grade Credits Age Born in English Attending Attending
percentile attempted at North is 1st campus campus
ranking in 1st year Male entry America language 1 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First year GPA < cutoff 0.450 0.024 0.015 0.000 0.017 −0.037 0.012 −0.010
(1.259) (0.076) (0.032) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.034) (0.027)
Constant (control mean) 30.991*** 4.386*** 18.719*** 0.374*** 0.864*** 0.729*** 0.444*** 0.217***
(0.745) (0.046) (0.021) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018)
Observations 12,530 12,530 12,530 12,530 12,530 12,530 12,530 12,530
notes: Estimated standard errors, clustered on GPA, are displayed in parentheses. Estimates are based on linear regression as 
described in Section IV, with rectangular kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.6.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 2. Probation Status at the End of the First Year
notes: Each hollow circle is the mean of the outcome in an interval of 0.05 around the point 
(including the lower, but not the upper, endpoint). The curve is predicted from local linear 
regressions with a bandwidth of 0.6 using rectangular kernel weights.
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C. the immediate response to Academic Probation
The immediate question that all students face at the end of their first year is 
whether or not to continue at the university.21 Students who have been placed on 
academic probation have been informed that they will be suspended if their GPAs 
do not meet the campus-set standard in their next term.22 However, their continued 
enrollment is not impeded in any other way at that point in time.
The first column of Table 4 shows the estimated impact on the decision of stu-
dents to permanently leave the university at the end of their first year. The estimate, 
which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicates that being placed 
on  academic probation at the end of the first year increases the probability that a 
 student leaves the university by 1.8 percentage points, or by 44 percent of the control 
mean.23
Figure 3 and columns 2–7 of Table 4 explore the extent to which different subgroups 
of students respond in different ways to being placed on probation at the end of the first 
year.24 These results suggest that the average effect masks substantial heterogeneity. 
21 Charles F. Manski (1989) and Joseph G. Altonji (1993) develop extensive models that explore the sequential 
nature of the schooling decision under uncertainty.
22 In results not shown, we find that suspension is a credible threat. Being placed on probation substantially 
increases the probability that students are ever suspended.
23 It should be noted that the control mean is not the overall dropout rate but, rather, the drop-out rate for 
students just above the cutoff.
24 In results not shown, we examined the response to being placed on probation in years beyond the first year. 
In order to maintain a proper control group, this analysis requires dropping any students placed on probation in 
any earlier year. This restriction, in addition to attrition, leads to substantially smaller sample sizes and no results 
were statistically significant.
Table 3—Estimated Discontinuity in Probation Status
HS grades HS grades Native Nonnative
All < median > median Male Female English English
Relevant group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent variable: on academic probation after first evaluation
First year GPA < cutoff 0.994*** 0.995*** 0.990*** 0.990*** 0.996*** 0.993*** 0.997***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant (control mean) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 12,530 9,473 3,057 4,701 7,829 9,006 3,524
dependent variable: Ever on academic probation
First year GPA < cutoff 0.665*** 0.653*** 0.705*** 0.625*** 0.690*** 0.677*** 0.635***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
Constant (control mean) 0.330*** 0.343*** 0.286*** 0.366*** 0.308*** 0.317*** 0.362***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022)
Observations 12,530 9,473 3,057 4,701 7,829 9,006 3,524
notes: Estimated standard errors, clustered on GPA, are displayed in parentheses. Estimates are based on linear 
regression as described in Section IV, with rectangular kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.6.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The estimated impact on students with high school grades below the median of those 
entering the university is small in magnitude and not significant. Our results suggest 
that the discouragement effect is greater for students that performed relatively better in 
high school (above the median of students entering the university). For these students, 
we find that being placed on probation at the end of the first year more than doubles 
the probability of dropping out immediately (significant at the 10 percent level). The 
estimated impact is so great for this group of students that they are just as likely to drop 
out as their counterparts who earned lower grades in high school.
We also find heterogeneous effects across gender. Our estimates indicate that 
being placed on academic probation doubles the probability that men drop out at the 
end of their first year, but has no effect on the decision of women to continue at the 
university. In results not shown, we find this gender difference does not appear to be 
driven by differences in the types of courses that men and women attempt in their 
first year.25 The results that follow indicate that it is not that women do not respond 
to being placed on probation, but that they respond differently.26
Last, we find that probation increases the probability of dropping out for native 
English speakers, but that there is no impact on nonnative English speakers. It is 
important to note that this difference cannot be attributed to characteristics specific 
to students who move to Canada for college since all of the students in the sample 
attended high school in the same province.27
25 Specifically, we have separately considered the impact for students who took first year courses that dispro-
portionately enrolled men and for students who took first year courses that disproportionately enrolled women. 
Regardless of the gender composition of the peers in their first year courses, we find no evidence that being placed 
on academic probation impacts the decision to drop out for women. We do find evidence that it impacts men, 
however. We have also analyzed the impact for students who took at least half of their first year credits in science 
courses versus those who did not. Similar gender differences appear in these results.
26 In results not shown, we have separately estimated the effects for men with high school grades above the 
median, women with high school grades above the median, men with high school grades below the median, and 
women with high school grades below the median. While the estimates are imprecise, they indicate that the 
discouragement effect is greater for students with high school grades above the median regardless of gender. 
Similarly, the discouragement effect is greater for men than women regardless of which group, based on high 
school grades, is considered. It should not be surprising, then, that the discouragement effect is greatest for men 
with higher high school performance. For these students, being placed on probation increases the probability of 
dropping out by 6.6 percentage points.
27 Those who attended high school outside the province were omitted due to a missing high school grade 
measure.
Table 4—Estimated Effect on the Decision to Leave after the First Evaluation
HS grades HS grades Native Nonnative
All < median > median Male Female English English
Relevant group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First year GPA < cutoff 0.018** 0.013 0.032* 0.037** 0.006 0.028*** −0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Constant (control mean) 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 12,530 9,473 3,057 4,701 7,829 9,006 3,524
notes: Estimated standard errors, clustered on GPA, are displayed in parentheses. Estimates are based on linear 
regression as described in Section IV, with rectangular kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.6.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 3. Stratified Results for Voluntarily Leaving School 
at the End of the First Year
notes: Each hollow circle is the mean of the outcome in an interval of 0.05 around the point (including the lower, 
but not the upper, endpoint). The curve is predicted from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.6 using 
rectangular kernel weights.
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D. the impact on subsequent Performance
Students on academic probation who choose to remain at the university have a 
substantial incentive to improve their grades to the campus-set standard. Failing to 
do so results in being suspended from the university for a year. Figure 4 and the first 
column of Table 5 show the impact of being placed on academic probation on the 
subsequent GPAs of students using the full sample. Specifically, the outcome vari-
able is a student’s GPA in the next session in which they are evaluated.28 The esti-
mates suggest that being placed on academic probation causes students to improve 
their GPAs by approximately 0.23 grade points, a 74 percent greater improvement 
than students who just surpass the probationary cutoff. Columns 2–7 show that the 
estimated effects on GPAs are also positive when we separately consider groups 
defined by students’ prior academic performance, gender, and native language.
It is important to note that these estimates might be biased by the effect of 
academic probation on the composition of students who continue to enroll in the 
university. For example, if academic probation results in the attrition of relatively 
low-ability students within any group under consideration, then we would expect the 
estimated impact on GPAs to be positive, even if being placed on probation has no 
effect on individual behavior beyond the choice to drop out. On the other hand, if the 
highest ability students are most discouraged from returning to the university, then 
the estimated impact on GPAs will be biased downward.
Table 5 also presents results from a formal bound analysis using the trimming 
procedure suggested by Lee (2008), with bootstrapped standard errors in parenthe-
ses. The intuition behind this analysis is straightforward. To find a lower bound for 
the estimated impact on students’ GPAs, we assume that being placed on academic 
probation causes students to drop out who would have performed worst in the subse-
quent term if they had remained. Thus, we can make the control group comparable 
by dropping the bottom students from its distribution. The estimated impact on the 
probability of dropping out at the end of the first year provides the share of students 
who need to be dropped to make the groups comparable.29 A similar procedure, 
trimming the top students from the control group’s distribution, is used to estimate 
the upper bound.30 This bound analysis demonstrates that, for all of the samples we 
consider, the positive effects we find on students’ subsequent GPAs are too great to 
28 Note that the “next session” will be a summer session if students are enrolled in summer classes and a sec-
ond year session if they are not. If we were to use only second year GPAs, there would be missing data for students 
placed on academic probation after their first year who do poorly in summer school and are suspended for their 
second year. While summer school grades tend to be higher than grades during the rest of the year, in results not 
shown but available upon request, we find no statistically significant impact of academic probation on the prob-
ability that a student takes summer courses, and estimates are nearly identical when controlling for whether or not 
a student’s next session is in the summer.
29 Note that in any bootstrap replications in which the estimated effect on dropping out is negative, students 
from the top of the treatment group’s distribution need to be dropped to make the treatment and control groups 
comparable.
30 The distribution of controls referred to here are those students in good academic standing who are given 
a non-zero weight in the analysis (those within the 0.6 bandwidth). We should note that this procedure was 
developed for standard regression equations and does not apply directly to regression discontinuity designs, but 
remains useful as an illustration of how large the biases could be. The optimal trimming strategy for regression 
discontinuity designs would likely entail more trimming near the cutoff. Although we have not done this per se, 
we have verified that our results, including the bound estimates, are robust to using smaller bandwidths.
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Figure 4. GPA in Next Enrolled Term
notes: Each hollow circle is the mean of the outcome in an interval of 0.05 around the point 
(including the lower, but not the upper, endpoint). The curve is predicted from local linear 
regressions with a bandwidth of 0.6 using rectangular kernel weights.
Table 5—Estimated Discontinuities in Subsequent GPA
HS grades HS grades Native Nonnative
All < median > median Male Female English English
Relevant group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. dependent variable: next term GPA
First year GPA < cutoff 0.233*** 0.247*** 0.179** 0.207*** 0.246*** 0.229*** 0.240***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.081) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.055)
Constant (control mean) 0.312*** 0.275*** 0.443*** 0.281*** 0.330*** 0.309*** 0.318***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.044) (0.027) (0.024) (0.020) (0.035)
Observations 11,258 8,457 2,801 4,166 7,092 8,012 3,246
Lower bound estimate 0.186 0.207 0.083 0.111 0.224 0.142 0.228
(0.031) (0.039) (0.099) (0.063) (0.041) (0.054) (0.057)
Upper bound estimate 0.259 0.270 0.212 0.258 0.258 0.262 0.247
(0.028) (0.031) (0.084) (0.042) (0.038) (0.041) (0.054)
Panel B. dependent variable: Probability of improving GPA in next term
First year GPA < cutoff 0.099*** 0.109*** 0.061* 0.075*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.070***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024)
Constant (control mean) 0.693*** 0.680*** 0.737*** 0.680*** 0.700*** 0.691*** 0.697***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019)
Observations 11,258 8,457 2,801 4,166 7,092 8,012 3,246
notes: Estimated standard errors, clustered on GPA, are displayed in parentheses. Estimates are based on linear regression as 
described in Section IV, with rectangular kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.6.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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be explained by the additional attrition caused by academic probation. In addition to 
having positive estimates for all of the lower bounds, Imbens and Manski’s (2004) 
95 percent confidence intervals do not include zero for any group except for the 
group of students with high school grades above the median.31
Finally, Table 5 shows estimated effects on the probability that students improve 
their grades. For students on probation, this outcome is crucial since it corresponds 
to the performance standard that they face and failure leads to suspension. The esti-
mates demonstrate significant effects for all of the groups considered. Again, while 
the estimated bounds are not shown, these effects are too big to be attributed to non-
random attrition induced by academic probation.
E. the impacts on Graduation
We now consider the long-run effects of being placed on academic probation 
at the end of the first year. Since these outcomes are measured at a later date, it is 
important to keep in mind that some students who were in good standing after their 
first year have been placed on academic probation in subsequent evaluations.32
While it is relatively simple to analyze the impact of being placed on academic 
probation on the probability of graduation, it is difficult to unpack the various 
mechanisms that are set into motion by the treatment. The estimates in Section VC 
demonstrated that a sizable share of students around the threshold drop out of the 
university as a result of being placed on probation. If this were the only effect, then 
we would expect academic probation to either reduce the probability of graduat-
ing or, if the only students who drop out are those who would not have graduated 
regardless, to have no effect. However, if academic probation motivates the remain-
ing students to improve their grades, as our estimates suggest in Section VD, then 
academic probation might increase the probability of graduating. Finally, academic 
probation might reduce the probability of graduation because it increases the prob-
ability of suspension, which likely increases the probability that a student drops out 
before finishing his degree.33
Figure 5 and column 1 of Table 6 show the estimated impacts on whether or not a 
student has graduated within four, five, or six years of their initial enrollment.34 The 
estimates are consistently negative which suggests that being placed on academic 
probation at the end of the first year of college reduces the probability of graduating 
for the average student near the threshold, although these estimates are imprecise.
Columns 2–7 of Table 6 show the estimated impacts on graduation rates across 
different subgroups. Although we usually cannot rule out that the impacts are the 
31 In addition to selection bias, we have explored behavioral mechanisms that might explain the observed 
effects on GPAs. We find no evidence that being placed on probation causes returning students to enroll in easier 
courses, using average course grades as the measure of difficulty. On the other hand, we do find that being placed 
on probation reduces the number of units that students take in their second year by one-third of a credit (9 per-
cent). However, some of this effect may be due to attrition midway through the second year.
32 Further, some controls will have been suspended for poor performance in reported terms.
33 The estimated effects on suspension can be found in prior versions of this paper.
34 For these estimates, our sample is restricted to students in cohorts who are observed for at least four, five, 
or six years, respectively, whether they graduate or not. We have verified that the estimated impacts on graduation 
within four years and graduation within five years are similar when we use a consistent sample (of students who 
can be observed for at least six years).
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same across the groups, the estimated impact on the probability of graduating within 
five or six years is strikingly large for students with high school grades above the 
median. For these students, being placed on probation after their first year reduces 
the probability of graduation within six years by 14.5 percentage points.35 There 
are two primary reasons this effect is so large. First, the impact on dropping out at 
the end of the first year is relatively large for this group. Second, students with high 
school grades above the median who return to school after being placed on proba-
tion do not do any better than their counterparts with high school grades below the 
median. However, students with high school grades above the median who barely 
avoid being placed on probation in their first year perform relatively well in the long-
run compared to their counterparts with high school grades below the median.
VI.  Discussion
As a whole, the most striking feature of our results is the heterogeneity in stu-
dents’ responses to academic probation. Though probation approximately doubles 
the probability that males will leave school, it has no impact on female reenrollment 
rates. Similarly, probation more than doubles the probability that students who per-
formed better in high school will leave school, but has little impact on the reenroll-
ment decision of the students that performed worse in high school. Finally, being 
placed on probation increases the probability that native English speakers drop out 
by approximately 50 percent, but has no impact on students whose native language is 
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Figure 5. Graduation Rates
notes: Each hollow circle is the mean of the outcome in an interval of 0.05 around the point 
(including the lower, but not the upper, endpoint). The curve is predicted from local linear 
regressions with a bandwidth of 0.6 using rectangular kernel weights.
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not English. At the same time, we find that being placed on probation improves the 
grades of returning students for all of the subgroups we consider.
These findings are consistent with the predictions of Bénabou and Tirole’s (2000) 
model of performance standards. To review, the model predicts that introducing a 
performance standard will cause some agents to opt out (students to drop out) and 
improve the performance of those who remain (increase the grades of students who 
return). The model also predicts that those with the lowest ability should be most 
likely to drop out, where an agent’s ability is defined as her probability of meeting 
the performance standard. Within the context of our analysis, this implies a student 
on academic probation makes the enrollment decision based on the probability of 
sufficiently improving her GPA, so as to avoid suspension. That is, students who are 
less likely to improve their GPAs should be more likely to drop out. Unfortunately, 
we cannot test this prediction with our data because we cannot observe the probabil-
ity of meeting the performance standard for students that leave school.
Because the model focuses on students’ abilities to meet the performance stan-
dard, it would explain the heterogeneity that we observe in those terms. That is, 
the large discouragement effect for students who performed best in high school, 
males, and native English speakers, would reflect that students in these groups have 
relatively low probabilities of improving their grades upon returning to school after 
Table 6—Estimated Effects on Graduation
HS grades HS grades Native Nonnative
All < median > median Male Female English English
Relevant group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. dependent variable: graduated after four years
First year GPA < cutoff −0.020 −0.019 −0.020 −0.045 −0.004 −0.047** 0.048
(0.017) (0.019) (0.048) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.034)
Constant (control mean) 0.272*** 0.265*** 0.296*** 0.214*** 0.307*** 0.277*** 0.258***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.034) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023)
Observations 8,821 6,826 1,995 3,373 5,448 6,406 2,415
Panel B. dependent variable: graduated after five years
First year GPA < cutoff −0.044* −0.025 −0.113** −0.055 −0.039 −0.065** 0.004
(0.026) (0.030) (0.049) (0.040) (0.030) (0.028) (0.042)
Constant (control mean) 0.566*** 0.550*** 0.620*** 0.503*** 0.606*** 0.552*** 0.603***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.028) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029)
Observations 7,293 5,610 1,683 2,799 4,494 5,320 1,973
Panel C. dependent variable: graduated after six years
First year GPA < cutoff −0.024 0.007 −0.145*** −0.081* 0.008 −0.041 0.007
(0.024) (0.028) (0.053) (0.042) (0.031) (0.030) (0.045)
Constant (control mean) 0.674*** 0.652*** 0.760*** 0.646*** 0.693*** 0.657*** 0.726***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.016) (0.032)
Observations 6,005 4,649 1,356 2,313 3,692 4,417 1,588
notes: Estimated standard errors, clustered on GPA, are displayed in parentheses. Estimates are based on linear 
regression as described in Section IV, with rectangular kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.6.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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being placed on probation. At the same time, differences in how these students 
update their self-perceived abilities might also explain their different responses. For 
example, even if they are of higher ability, students with higher high school grades 
might be more likely to drop out after being placed on probation because they update 
self-perceived ability by a greater amount. The differences we observe might also be 
driven by differences in risk aversion, costs of effort, or returns to education. All of 
these explanations are speculative, however, and further research is needed to iden-
tify what underlies these differences. We should also note that it is not a given that 
students who performed best in high school, males, and native English speakers, are 
reacting too strongly to being placed on probation. Females, students that performed 
worse in high school, and nonnative English speakers may be reacting too little.
VII.  Conclusion
Overall, our results support Bénabou and Tirole’s (2000) model of performance 
standards. We confirm that a performance standard has a discouragement effect 
(causing students to drop out of school) and an encouragement effect (improving the 
grades of returning students).36
Consistent with a sizable literature on gender differences in students’ responses to 
positive incentives, we find substantial gender differences in response to a negative 
incentive. We find that academic probation doubles the probability that men drop 
out, but has no such effect on women. We also find evidence that being placed on 
probation improves the grades of those that return for individuals of both genders.
Ideally, a performance standard might just “weed out” those who have no chance 
at success and serve as a motivation for others.37 We do find positive effects on 
the subsequent GPAs of students who continue to enroll. In our setting, we might 
hope the standard would improve graduation rates. Instead, our results suggest that 
being placed on probation at the end of the first year of college reduces the probabil-
ity that a student graduates. The impact is especially strong for students with high 
school grades above the median for whom it reduces the probability of graduation by 
approximately 14.5 percentage points. This effect is so large that these students are 
no more likely to graduate than students with high school grades below the median.
Our results have important consequences for the wide variety of circumstances 
in which standards might be applied as a means of improving performance. We 
confirm that a performance standard can entail a trade-off between causing some 
to improve and causing others to give up. Further, our results indicate that intro-
ducing a performance standard is particularly effective in motivating women and 
students with relatively low high school grades. On the other hand, concerns about 
discouragement are especially relevant for men and those with the highest levels of 
prior academic performance.
36 As we alluded to in the introduction, concerns about student discouragement are often raised in discussions 
about high school exit exams, another example of an educational performance standard.
37 While it is possible that the university wants to weed out students who are a poor fit, conversations with 
administrators suggest the policy is aimed solely at promoting student achievement. The encouraging letter sent 
to students who are placed on probation further supports this administrative stance.
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Appendix: Letter Sent to Students at Campus 2
Dear < first name >:
Your academic record indicates that you are experiencing challenges with your 
studies at xxxxxxxxxxx. As a result, you have been placed “On Probation” at the 
end of the xxxxxxx session. “On Probation” is an academic status applied to a stu-
dent if he or she:
1.  Is having difficulty achieving a term average of at least 1.7 GPA or a yearly 
average of 1.5 CGPA.
2.  Is having difficulty meeting performance expectations and/or deadlines as 
outlined by the course instructor.
3.  Is having difficulty achieving the minimum grades required for graduation.
A student who at the end of any session during which they are on probation has a 
cumulative GPA of less than 1.5 and a sessional of less than 1.7 shall be suspended. 
Therefore, it is imperative that you seek assistance to improve your academic stand-
ing to avoid further sanction.
Rest assured that you can improve this status and that xxxxxxxxxxxx offers assis-
tance at many junctions. First, you can access help by making an appointment with an 
academic advisor in the Office of the Registrar to develop strategies to improve your 
academic record. Book an appointment at xxx-xxx-xxxx or online at www.xxxxxxxxx. 
Second, contact xxxxxxxx for assistance with study habits, note taking, effective 
research, time management, study groups, and peer mentors. Finally, the xxxxxxxxx 
offers skills and interest testing which can help you focus on your strengths.
We know that you are capable of academic success, based on your academic 
record at admission. A good academic record is essential for entry to Limited 
Enrolment programs, graduate school, and professional schools. Let us review your 
goals and help you develop a plan to achieve them.
You have the opportunity and available support to be successful. Please utilize 
our services to insure your future success.
For further information on academic status, please refer to xxxxxxxx of the 
Academic Calendar or here: http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
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